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2009 Monsanto Lecture 
INTENT IN TORT LAW 
Keith N. Hylton∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Prosser’s Handbook of the Law of Torts says that intention in tort law 
“is not necessarily a hostile intent, or a desire to do any harm.  Rather it 
is an intent to bring about a result which will invade the interests of 
another in a way that the law will not sanction.”1  The problem with this 
description is that it is circular, at least if we view the statement as an 
attempt to set out in general terms the type of intent that must be 
established to hold a defendant liable in tort.  How do we know that 
someone has the intent necessary to find his conduct unlawful?  
According to Prosser, we see if the actor intended to bring about an 
unlawful invasion; where the definition of such an invasion depends on 
the actor’s intent. 
This Lecture avoids the circularity problem in defining intent.  I 
argue that intent standards in tort law are objective and serve important 
regulatory functions.  The intent standards can be explained on the basis 
of the incentive effects of tort liability rules.2  Intent standards are easier 
to understand if we work backwards from an understanding of the 
desired impact of the rules to the language of the rules themselves. 
The core of my argument is that intent rules work primarily as 
pricing mechanisms that internalize costs optimally, in the sense that 
they induce potential tortfeasors to choose the option that is least costly 
to society.  The intent standard for battery discourages socially 
undesirable acts and at the same time avoids discouraging socially 
beneficial activity.  The intent standard for assault is more difficult to 
satisfy than that for battery, and because of this, it encourages (or avoids 
discouraging) the speech that is often intermixed with potentially 
threatening conduct.  The intent standards for cases of economic 
                                                 
∗ Honorable Paul J. Liacos Professor of Law, Boston University, knhylton@bu.edu.  This 
Lecture was prepared for the 2009 Monsanto Lecture, Valparaiso University, April 23, 2009.  
I thank Ken Simons for detailed comments on an early draft. 
1 WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 31 (West, 4th ed. 1971). 
2 This Lecture’s focus on incentives and regulatory function can be contrasted with non-
economic theories of intention in tort law.  See John Finnis, Intention in Tort Law, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 229 (David G. Owen ed., 1995); Peter Cane, 
Mens Rea in Tort Law, 20 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 533 (2000); Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking 
Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463 (1992). 
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predation (inducement of breach of contract, unfair competition) reflect 
the same effort to discourage socially harmful acts without deterring 
desirable activity.  In addition to the optimal internalization goal, 
transaction costs play a role in the specification of intent requirements.  
The subtle difference between the intent requirements for trespass and 
battery can be explained on the basis of transaction costs. 
As a preliminary matter, internalization for its own sake is not a 
desirable goal for the law.3  Internalization is desirable because it 
discourages socially harmful conduct, or in other words, contributes to 
the ideal level of deterrence.4  My argument means the same if one were 
to substitute “optimal deterrence” or “optimal regulation” in place of 
“optimal internalization” wherever the words occur below.  I focus on 
the word internalization because that is the easiest way to think about 
the immediate effects of intent rules. 
II.  INTENTIONAL TORTS:  REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Theories of intent in tort law are either subjectivist or objectivist.  The 
subjectivist approaches, which have been explored more seriously in the 
criminal law than in the torts literature, appear to be grounded 
ultimately in Kantian theory.5  Under the subjectivist approach to 
intentional torts, the law aims to punish tortfeasors for intentionally or at 
least knowingly violating norms that are implicit in the law.  Those 
                                                 
3 I especially want to distinguish the approach taken here from one version of the 
corrective justice approach, that of Jules Coleman.  Coleman’s view of corrective justice is 
that it requires nothing more than the annulment of unjust gains and losses.  See Jules L 
Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 349, 357 (1992).  While it 
might be unfair to describe this approach as internalization for its own sake, it lacks a 
functional basis for the internalization goal.  The basis for internalization in Coleman’s 
theory is the Aristotelian premise that unjust impositions should be cancelled.  Since only 
unjust impositions are to be cancelled (not all impositions) it follows that the core problem 
in Coleman’s theory is determining the meaning of justice. 
4 The ideal or optimal level of deterrence is assumed to be determined by the familiar 
Hand Formula (or Learned Hand analysis), evaluated with complete accuracy.  Under the 
Hand Formula, forbearance on the part of the injurer is socially desirable whenever the 
burden of forbearance is less than the loss that would otherwise be imposed on victims.  See 
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).  I assume below that 
intentional torts do not confer a long run evolutionary benefit, as they may have in the 
distant past.  See generally KONRAD LORENZ, ON AGGRESSION (Marjorie Kerr Wilson trans., 
1963).  If intentional torts conferred a long run evolutionary benefit, then punishment 
appears to be less desirable.  However, whatever long-run benefits were secured through 
the aggressive instinct, those benefits have tapered off quite substantially by now.  Treating 
the external evolutionary benefits of aggression as essentially zero is not a serious error. 
5 See generally R.A. DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY & CRIMINAL LIABILITY:  PHILOSOPHY OF 
ACTION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1990); MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME:  THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1993). 
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norms, in turn, reflect the view that it is morally objectionable if an actor 
uses others as a means to his own ends or fails to respect their 
autonomy.6  It follows that the actor’s true mental state is important in 
determining the appropriateness of liability. 
The objectivist approach, in contrast, views mental state as having a 
weak relevance at best to the appropriateness of punishment.  Legal 
standards are external to or exogenous with respect to the actor’s mental 
state.  The characterization of an actor’s mental state plays a role, if 
necessary, in designing an optimal regulatory system, but there is 
certainly no requirement under the objective approach to identify the 
true mental state of the actor as a primitive input in the process of 
determining liability. 
The objectivist literature in tort law begins with Holmes’s treatment 
of the legal standards governing intent in the first three chapters of The 
Common Law.7  The first chapter, on criminal law, examines intent 
standards for crimes.  Holmes argues that intent is reducible to 
knowledge of facts that allows the average person to foresee the harm his 
actions will inflict on another.  Thus, a criminal defendant could be 
found to have had intent to murder even though he did not really intend 
to kill.  For example, if an individual leaves an infant out in the cold 
alone without food, he could be deemed to have acted with intent to 
murder even though he may have sincerely hoped that someone would 
find and care for the infant. 
In addition to the objectivist definition of intent, which reduces it to 
knowledge of certain facts, the intent standard functions according to 
Holmes as an index of the probability of harm, in the sense that it allows 
courts to convict actors for otherwise innocent acts on the theory that 
those acts were likely to lead to immediate serious injury.  For example, 
an actor can be convicted for attempted murder when the facts indicate 
an intent to follow through to the point of committing murder. 
                                                 
6 Richard Epstein, in his early period as a corrective justice proponent, argued that tort 
liability is presumptively strict because most torts involve an invasion (i.e., without 
consent) of autonomy.  See Richard A. Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 391, 391–
92 (1975).  Charles Fried, a corrective justice proponent, took the view that liability should 
be presumptively based on negligence because an effort to use others for your purposes 
inevitably necessitated an unfair extraction from a hypothetical aggregate social risk 
budget.  See CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES:  PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL 
CHOICE 137 (1970).  Ernest Weinrib’s corrective justice theory is centered, like Fried’s, on 
the existence of an implicit social contract.  See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, TOWARD A MORAL 
THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE LAW, IN JUSTICE, RIGHTS, AND TORT LAW 123 (Michel D. Bayles & 
Bruce Chapman eds., 1983); Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 
485, 491 (1989).  However, while Fried’s theory draws heavily on Rawls, Weinrib is more 
faithful to Kantian theory. 
7 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (A.B.A. 2009) (1881). 
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The Common Law’s second and third chapters, both on torts, continue 
with the argument that intent can be reduced to knowledge of facts that 
allows the ordinary person to foresee the harm his actions could cause.  
The intent standard necessary to trigger liability for trespass is especially 
low, or even trivial, Holmes suggests, because all that is necessary for 
liability is an act that interferes with someone else’s property rights.  
And to refer to something as an act implies that it is done with intent.  
One does not ordinarily refer to the involuntary contraction of muscles 
observed in a seizure as an act. 
One important position from Holmes that I adopt is that intent 
standards are objective, in the sense that they do not depend on what 
was actually in the mind of the defendant when he acted.  It is clear in 
the case of trespass that one can be found liable for it even though there 
was no intent to trespass.  The double-effect problem is a concern to 
subjectivist scholars, but has not had any impact on the law of 
intentional torts.8  The standard for assault requires intent to harm or to 
put someone in fear of immediate harm.  This can also be satisfied by an 
actor who did not really intend to harm or to frighten anyone.  For 
example, if A points an unloaded gun at B, he could be held liable for 
assault even though he sincerely, though erroneously, believed that B 
knew that the gun was unloaded. 
After Holmes, utilitarian analysis of intent standards does not 
appear in the literature again until Posner’s article on wounding to 
protect property and Epstein’s article on intentional harms.9  Posner’s 
article provided a cost-benefit (efficiency) justification for the law 
governing privileges to use deadly force to protect property.  Epstein’s 
article, in part a reaction to Posner, rejects any attempt to use cost-benefit 
analysis to understand the law on intentional torts.  Though Epstein’s 
approach, grounded in Kantian theory, is quite different from that taken 
here, his discussion is one of the first efforts to provide a rationale for the 
variation in intent standards observed in tort law.  Under Epstein’s 
analysis, a prima facie case for strict liability is established by the 
defendant’s unauthorized or nonconsensual touching of the plaintiff. 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Intent and Recklessness in Tort:  
The Practical Craft of Restating Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1133, 1140 (2001).  The double-effect 
problem arises when someone takes an action that may harm the victim but also may 
produce another effect, such as the brush-back pitch in baseball.  The pitcher may not want 
to harm the batter at all, but is aware that the batter might be injured as a result of this 
effort to prevent the batter from encroaching on the strike zone.  See Kimberly Ferzan, 
Beyond Intention, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1147, 1147 (2008).  
9 See generally Epstein, supra note 6; Richard A. Posner, Killing or Wounding to Protect a 
Property Interest, 14 J.L. & ECON. 201 (1971). 
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Posner returned to the intent question in an article with William 
Landes in 1981.10  They used the Hand Formula’s comparison of the 
burden of precaution with avoided harms to explain why tort law 
imposes strict liability for intentional torts.  Under the Hand Formula, a 
failure to adopt a specific precaution is unreasonable if the burden of the 
precaution is less than the harms that would have been avoided by its 
adoption.  According to Landes and Posner, the burden of avoiding the 
harm is especially small in the case of intentional torts—in fact, negative, 
since the tortfeasor saves on effort by doing nothing rather than 
attempting to kill his neighbor.  Since the burden of precaution is 
extremely low (negative) and the likelihood of harm substantial, they 
argued that it follows that strict liability should apply as a general rule to 
intentional torts. 
An important potential flaw in Landes and Posner’s reasoning was 
later exposed by Dorsey Ellis.11  When you choose not to take your 
neighbor’s property, Ellis suggested, the burden of precaution 
(forbearance) is not negative.  The burden of precaution is the disutility 
you experience by forgoing the taking.  If you had expected to enjoy 
great benefits as a result of expropriating your neighbor’s property then 
the burden of precaution is positive after all.  And if you expected 
unusually great benefits from the expropriation, say because his 
property is much more valuable in your hands than in his, then the 
burden of precaution may exceed the avoided losses.  Hence, it does not 
follow immediately from the Hand Formula, according to Dorsey, that 
all intentional torts are instances of inefficient conduct. 
Landes and Posner returned to the intentional torts question in their 
book The Economic Structure of Tort Law.12  Rather than refer to the 
burden of precaution, they say that liability for an intentional tort is 
implied by two factors: the likelihood of harm, and the burden of 
avoiding it.  Intent is inferred, according to Landes and Posner, when the 
probability of harm is very high or when the cost of avoiding the harm, 
for a given probability of occurring, is extremely low.  One clear case of 
intent is where the actor punches the victim in the nose; the probability 
of harm is high, and given that the actor must have been aware of it, we 
should infer intent.  The other case of intent involves a low probability of 
harm but also a very low cost of avoidance; for example, someone stands 
                                                 
10 See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Intentional 
Torts, 1 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 127 (1981). 
11 See generally Dorsey Ellis, An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts:  A Comment, 3 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 45 (1983). 
12 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 
(1987). 
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over a highway dropping bricks down toward the pavement.  If the 
traffic is sparse, his actual probability of hitting a car may be low.  On the 
other hand, since it was easy to avoid any harm to a driver in this setting, 
the actor should be said to have intended the harm if it occurs even 
though the probability was low. 
Landes and Posner’s second description of their rationale for the 
intent standard, as a basis for strict liability, avoids Dorsey’s criticism 
and remains consistent with the Hand Formula as it has been applied by 
courts.13  However, as a theory of strict liability for intentional torts, it 
remains incomplete.  If a man suffering from starvation steals bread from 
his neighbor after the neighbor refuses to give it to him, he is still guilty 
of a trespass even though the burden of avoiding the intentional tort is 
very high.14  Moreover, unlike Holmes, and unlike Epstein, Landes and 
Posner make no effort to justify the different intent standards observed 
in tort law.  Their treatment of intentional torts makes no distinctions 
between the intent necessary to trigger liability under trespass, battery, 
and assault. 
Landes and Posner’s approach might be seen as consistent with 
Holmes’s because Holmes claimed that intent could almost always be 
reduced to knowledge of facts.  But the facts necessary to trigger liability 
differ among the various types of intentional tort.  For example, to be 
liable for trespass, one need only know that he is walking on land—there 
is no need for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant knew that he was 
on someone else’s land.  Assault, on the other hand, requires the 
defendant to know more facts to be liable.  The defendant must know 
facts that would allow the ordinary person, if carrying out the same acts, 
to infer that his conduct would harm someone or put someone in 
immediate fear of harm. 
Intent requirements vary in substance as well as form across 
intentional tort categories.  I will explain the variations in those 
requirements, starting with the minimal intent standard for trespass, and 
the close, though somewhat higher, standard for battery.  I will then 
explain the standards for assault and other torts involving intent to 
harm.  However, before launching into these explanations, I describe the 
levels of intent implied by the cases. 
                                                 
13 This is not the same as the perfectly accurate evaluation referred to in note 4 supra 
because it makes no attempt to take individual idiosyncratic features into account.  In other 
words, the Hand analysis is not quite the same thing as an unalloyed efficiency test. 
14 The theft-of-bread example cannot be treated, in an effort to rescue the Landes-Posner 
theory, as a case of high subjective disutility, where the objective social cost of avoidance is 
low (or negative).  In any moderately responsible accounting of objective costs, the cost of 
death from starvation would be incorporated. 
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III.  LEVELS OF INTENT 
There are essentially four levels of intent in tort law.  They can be 
arranged along a spectrum from involuntary conduct to acts carried out 
with the sole purpose of harming someone. 
A. Involuntary 
The involuntary conduct category consists of acts that are not 
planned or controlled by the actor or injurer.  For example, a sudden 
seizure causes the injurer to punch the victim in the nose.  Or, the injurer 
is riding on a horse, the horse throws him, and he flies into the air and 
lands on the victim, or lands on the victim’s property.  In these examples, 
the injury is not the result of some planned, intended, or controlled act.15  
It is the result of a force, internal or external, that the injurer could not 
control. 
B. Primary Volitional 
Primary volitional conduct involves acts that are controlled by the 
actor, but in which the actor is not aware of or cannot foresee the 
immediate physical consequences of his action.16 
How could this happen?  Consider the battery context first.  One 
example is where the actor suffers from some form of insanity that 
makes him unaware of his immediate surroundings.17  Suppose, for 
example, he grabs the arm of a bystander, thinking he is actually in the 
process of opening a door.  In this case, the actor is aware of his own 
physical movements; he is aware and intends to be in the process of 
grabbing something and moving it.  However, he is unable to determine 
accurately the object that is being affected by his action.  Another 
example is that of a child too immature to know the immediate 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., Cordas v. Peerless Transp. Co., 27 N.Y.S.2d 198, 199–200 (N.Y.C. Ct. 1941) 
(defendant jumped out of cab to avoid armed robber, cab ran into plaintiff); Lobert v. Pack, 
9 A.2d 365, 366 (1939) (defendant, asleep in back seat of car, kicked seat causing plaintiff to 
crash).  See generally Smith v. Stone, 82 Eng. Rep. 533 (K.B. 1647) (defendant carried onto 
plaintiff’s property by others); MARK F. GRADY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 97–103 
(1994). 
16 “Immediate physical consequences” should be distinguished from “incapacity to 
realize the probable consequences” used by Bohlen.  See Francis H. Bohlen, Liability in Tort 
of Infants and Insane Persons, 23 MICH. L. REV. 9, 9 (1924).  The “incapacity to realize 
probable consequences” description could apply to someone who understands the 
immediate physical consequences (physical contact) but not the likely result (injury). 
17 Fitzgerald v. Lawhorn, 294 A.2d 338, 338 (1972) (defendant shot plaintiff while 
suffering from insane delusion that the plaintiff was not a person and that plaintiff was 
assaulting him). 
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consequences of certain physical conditions.18  For example, the child is 
unaware of the laws of gravity, so he does not know that he will fall 
from a table as he runs off the side of it.  Or suppose the child pulls the 
chair away as a person is about to sit, but the child is too immature to 
foresee the immediate consequence that the victim will fall to the 
ground. 
Yet another example is the case of someone who yawns, stretching 
his hands out, unaware that his fist will hit a passerby.  If the actor is not 
aware of anyone near him,19 then this falls within the primary volitional 
category.  If the actor is aware that others are nearby and may be hit by 
his fist, then this is clearly a case of foreseeable harm and outside of the 
primary volitional category. 
In the trespass setting, primary volitional conduct involves a 
crossing of the boundary to someone’s property in which the actor is 
aware that he is walking but does so without an awareness of his 
physical surroundings.  Suppose, for example, the actor is sleepwalking 
or walking under some hypnotic trance.  The actor sees a completely 
different landscape from that which is really before him. 
C. Secondary Volitional 
Secondary volitional conduct involves actors who are aware of and 
can foresee the immediate physical consequences of their acts.  It helps to 
distinguish the battery and trespass cases. 
In the battery case, a secondary volitional actor knows that as he 
stretches his fist toward the victim’s nose, it will come into contact with 
the victim.  If he knows this and nothing else, he is at the secondary 
volitional level and this is so even if he cannot foresee that the contact 
will cause an injury such as a broken nose.  Vosburg v. Putney provides 
an example of a defendant whose intent was at the secondary volitional 
level.20  When George Putney kicked Andrew Vosburg in the knee, he 
apparently did not intend or foresee any harm, especially not the severe 
damage later attributed to the kick by the plaintiff. 
                                                 
18 See, e.g., Walker v. Kelly, 314 A.2d 785, 788 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1973) (upholding trial 
court’s finding that, although five-year-old girl threw rock that hit plaintiff’s forehead, she 
did not intend to strike plaintiff with rock); see also Horton v. Reaves, 526 P.2d 304, 306 
(Colo. 1974) (defendants, three- and four-year-old children, apparently pushed a five-week-
old baby off a bed, causing severe head injuries).  In Horton, the court held that the 
defendants were not liable for battery.  Id. at 308. 
19 See, e.g., Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292, 292 (1850) (defendant, walking backwards as 
he tried to separate fighting dogs, hit plaintiff in eye with stick); Moe v. Steenberg, 147 
N.W.2d 587, 588 (Minn. 1966) (defendant, skating backward, ran into plaintiff) . 
20 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891). 
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Another example is the act of pulling a chair away as the victim is 
trying to sit in it.  The secondary volitional actor knows the immediate 
physical consequence:  the victim will fall.  Thus, in Garratt v. Dailey, the 
five-year old boy who pulled the chair from under Ms. Garratt before she 
sat down probably understood that Ms. Garratt would suffer some 
contact with the ground.21  It does not matter that he may not have 
foreseen that Ms. Garratt would fracture her hip.  It is sufficient for the 
secondary volitional intent level that the injurer was aware that there 
would be some possibly unpleasant physical contact. 
In the trespass setting, secondary volitional conduct means being 
aware of the physical surroundings.  A secondary volitional actor need 
not know that he has crossed the boundary to another’s property.  
However, he is aware of his physical surroundings.  Unlike the primary 
volitional, he sees what is really before him. 
D. Tertiary Volitional:  Foresight and Intent 
An actor who meets the tertiary volitional level of intent foresees or 
intends the immediate harm or ultimate physical consequence of his 
actions.  This statement is obviously unclear and needs to be fleshed out 
with examples.  Consider the foresight case first.  In the battery context, a 
tertiary volitional actor foresees that his punch will harm the victim.  He 
does not necessarily foresee that his punch will lead through a complex 
chain of events to some great loss, such as death.  However, he is aware 
of some plausible injuries that are likely to occur, such as a bruised face.  
In the trespass context, a tertiary volitional actor is aware that he is 
crossing the boundary of another’s property.  He knows that the 
property owner will regard his crossing as a trespass. 
A more extreme case is where the tertiary volitional actor wants or 
intends to harm the victim.  For example, the actor foresees that his 
punch in the nose will lead to immediate physical injury to the victim 
and wants this to occur.  Or the actor pulls the chair away as the victim is 
about to sit, hoping to cause injury to the victim.  In the trespass context, 
a tertiary volitional actor may not only foresee that his actions will result 
in a trespass, but also aim to trespass on the victim's property.  For 
example, in Jacque v. Steenberg Homes,22 the defendant was warned 
                                                 
21 279 P.2d 1091, 1092 (Wash. 1955), appeal after remand, 304 P.2d 681 (Wash. 1956). 
22 563 N.W.2d 154, 156–57 (Wis. 1997).  Jacque returns us to the distinction between 
subjectivist and objectivist inquiries.  To a subjectivist, it is important that the defendant in 
Jacque did not have a desire to harm the plaintiffs; he only wanted to save money by cutting 
across their property.  To the objectivist, this distinction is irrelevant because the defendant 
knew that the intentional (“in your face”) trespass was a direct by-product of his decision 
to save money by cutting across the plaintiff’s property. 
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against trespassing on the plaintiff’s property but did so anyway in order 
to reduce the costs of delivering a mobile home to a customer. 
E. Implementation of Intent Standards 
In defining the terms primary volitional and secondary volitional, I 
implicitly assume that courts have no way of determining the thoughts 
inside someone’s head.  In every case, the level of intent is inferred from 
the facts.  If the facts are such that the average person would not have 
acted in the way the defendant did, knowing what the defendant must 
have known, unless he intended to harm the victim or at least was 
content with harming the victim as a step toward some other goal, then a 
court will infer intent to harm.  In this sense, all of the intent standards 
defined so far are assumed to be objective. 
IV.  EXPLAINING INTENT REQUIREMENTS 
When we say that liability for intentional torts is strict, the first 
question that must be answered is: what sort of intent?  If we regard 
intentional conduct as equivalent to voluntary conduct, then it is clear from the 
foregoing that liability is not strict for every intentional tort.  Strict liability 
applies only to those intentional torts that fall in the secondary and tertiary 
volitional categories. 
In general, tort liability requires as a minimum the secondary 
volitional level of intent, which means knowledge or foresight of the 
immediate physical consequences of an act.  Actors who satisfy the 
secondary and tertiary volitional levels may be held liable for 
compensatory damages under tort law, and those who satisfy the tertiary 
level may be held liable in addition for punitive damages.  Criminal law, 
on the other hand, requires the highest intent level in order to punish.  
The distinctions between intent levels can also be described in terms of 
the familiar labels “general intent” and “specific intent,” where 
secondary volitional describes cases of general intent, which is sufficient 
for tort liability, and tertiary volitional includes cases of specific intent, 
which is a requirement for criminal liability. 
Among the standard intentional tort claims, the level of intent 
necessary to hold a defendant liable varies according to the type of claim.  
Battery, trespass, and false imprisonment require awareness of 
immediate physical consequences—the secondary volitional level.23  
Assault requires intent to harm or to put one in fear of harm, which 
                                                 
23 Recent developments in tort doctrine have not altered this long-standing feature of the 
case law.  For a review with interesting observations on theory, see Kenneth W. Simons, A 
Restatement (Third) of Intentional Torts?, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (2006). 
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implies the tertiary volitional level of intent.  The same holds for an 
“offensive battery,” of the sort that might subject the actor to punitive 
damages.24  Defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claims also require the highest level of intent.25 
Why does tort law require awareness of immediate physical consequences as 
a minimum component of an intentional tort claim, and why do intent 
standards vary according to the type of intentional tort, and even within some 
categories of intentional tort (e.g., battery)?  These questions are addressed 
below. 
A. Secondary Volitional Conduct as a Minimum Requirement for Intentional 
Tort Liability: Trespass and Battery 
Awareness of immediate physical consequences, which I have 
described as secondary volitional conduct, is necessary and in most cases 
sufficient for tort liability because the law of intentional torts serves 
primarily as a pricing mechanism or collection of pricing rules that 
internalizes costs optimally.  The basic intuition was described by 
Holmes in the context of trespass. 
When a man goes upon his neighbor’s land, thinking it 
his own, he intends the very act or consequence 
complained of.  He means to intermeddle with a certain 
thing in a certain way, and it is just that intended 
intermeddling for which he is sued . . . .  One who 
diminishes the value of property by intentional damage 
knows it belongs to somebody.  If he thinks it belongs to 
himself, he expects whatever harm he may do to come 
out of his own pocket.  It would be odd if he were to get 
rid of the burden by discovering that it belonged to his 
neighbor.26 
This passage suggests that cost internalization is the aim of the intent 
standard for trespass.  However, cost internalization is also arguably the 
goal of the negligence rule, yet in the case of negligence the law does not 
require awareness of immediate physical consequences.  The law 
                                                 
24 Meadows v. Guptill, 856 F. Supp. 1362, 1365 (D. Ariz. 1993) (offensive sexual 
harassment and touching); Catlett v. Catlett, 388 S.E.2d 14, 15 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (battery 
and false imprisonment); Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553, 553 (1872) (spitting in face); Draper 
v. Baker, 21 N.W. 527, 528 (Wis. 1884) (same); Jones v. Fisher, 166 N.W.2d 175, 177 (Wis. 
1969) (pulling out plaintiff’s dentures). 
25 See HOLMES, supra note 7, at 138–40 (on defamation and intent); PROSSER, supra note 1, 
at 49–62 (on intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
26 HOLMES, supra note 7, at 97. 
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requires foreseeability of harmful consequences.  What explains the 
different knowledge requirements under trespass and negligence? 
The reason awareness of immediate physical consequences is 
necessary and generally sufficient for liability under the law of 
intentional torts, and not so under negligence law, is that the law triggers 
liability at the point at which you become aware, or should become 
aware, of the cost that your act will impose on someone.  In the case of 
intentional conduct, you are aware of the fact that a cost will be imposed 
on someone as long as you are aware of the immediate physical 
consequences of your act.  If you kick someone on the leg, you are aware 
that there is a potential cost that will be borne by the person kicked.  The 
only case where you would be unaware of that potential cost is when 
you are not aware of the fact that you are kicking a person.  Assuming 
you are aware that you are kicking a person, Holmes’s argument applies 
directly:  if that person is yourself, you will bear the cost yourself; if that 
person is another individual, you should not escape the cost, if 
internalization is indeed the goal of the law, by discovering that fact. 
One might argue that the costs of intentional torts would be 
internalized just as well by a rule that triggers liability for battery at the 
primary volitional level, when the actor is in control of his physical 
motions though unaware of any immediate physical consequences.  For 
example, suppose the actor, for all he can see, is standing alone in the 
desert.  He yawns, stretching out his hand, and punches a sudden visitor 
in the nose.  In this case, his intent level satisfies the primary volitional 
standard but not the secondary volitional standard.  Because a rule 
triggering liability at the primary volitional level would clearly lead to 
liability in the secondary volitional level cases as well, all of the costs of 
intentional conduct would be internalized under it. 
While it is true that the costs of intentional conduct would be 
internalized under the primary volitional standard, those costs would 
not be internalized optimally.  A primary volitional actor has no reason to 
perceive that his action will impose a cost on anyone.  Given this, 
liability would have no effect on his actions, other than to encourage him 
to stay inside his home alone.  Because such a general discouragement of 
activity is undesirable, using the primary volitional level as the 
triggering point for liability under the law of intentional torts does not 
internalize costs optimally.  The same argument obviously applies if the 
law provided no exemption for involuntary conduct. 
The tertiary volitional standard also fails to internalize costs 
optimally.  The reason is that under the tertiary volitional standard, the 
actor would not be held liable unless the facts suggested that he was 
aware that he would harm or intended to harm the victim.  Under this 
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rule, there would be a vast set of batteries and trespasses that would be 
excused from liability.  For example, the five-year-old boy in Garratt v. 
Dailey who pulled the chair from under Ms. Garratt could not be held 
liable under the tertiary volitional intent standard because he was not 
aware that he would harm Ms. Garratt.  The same holds in the double-
effect scenario:  for example, an orange rolls out of a door onto the 
sidewalk and the injurer, in order to get the orange and worried that the 
victim would get it first, pushes the victim out of the way.  Similarly, the 
trespasser who digs up your property, thinking it his own, would avoid 
liability under the tertiary volitional standard.  Since it would be far 
cheaper to reduce the value of someone else’s property rather than your 
own, we should expect frequent “unintended” trespasses under this rule.  
Many of them would reduce society’s wealth because the trespasser’s 
gain would be less than the loss imposed.27 
The upshot is that of the four potential intent standards identifiable 
in the case law—involuntary, primary volitional, secondary volitional, 
and tertiary volitional—the secondary volitional standard appears to be 
the only one capable of internalizing the costs of intentional torts such as 
battery and trespass in a manner that induces actors to choose the least 
costly option to society.  The secondary volitional standard regulates (or 
deters) optimally because it holds the injurer strictly liable for costs he 
imposes on others when he is aware of their imposition, and therefore, 
leaves the injurer with an incentive to impose those costs only when his 
benefits exceed them.  The secondary volitional standard avoids over-
internalization, or over-deterrence, by excusing the injurer from liability 
for the costs his acts impose on others when he is not (and has no reason 
to be) aware of their imposition and thereby avoids general 
discouragement of benign activity. 
Now consider negligent conduct.  You are shooting your arrow at a 
target.  The immediate target of your action is not another individual.  
But an individual runs across the path of your arrow as you shoot.  By 
assumption, you were not aware when you shot the arrow that there 
would be an immediate physical consequence to another individual.  
However, the question that arises in the negligence context is whether 
you should have foreseen the risk of a third party running across the 
path of your arrow.  If so, then you should have foreseen that a cost 
would be imposed on a third party.  Negligence law allows you to avoid 
liability only under the condition that the burden of avoiding that harm 
                                                 
27 To be sure, the negligence rule would remain in the background to be used against the 
injurer in these cases, but it would be a strange and unstable regime if the injurer had valid 
defenses against the obvious intentional tort, but could still be found liable on a negligence 
theory for the same conduct. 
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to a third party was extremely high.  Of course, in this example, the 
burden is low (simply aim your arrow in a different direction or hold 
your fire) so foreseeability will be sufficient for liability. 
My point in comparing negligent conduct to intentional conduct is 
not to reexamine the benefit-burden balancing of the Hand Formula.28  It 
is to show that foreseeability of harm, a more demanding knowledge 
requirement than “awareness of immediate physical consequences,” is a 
necessary condition (though not always sufficient in view of the Hand 
Formula) for liability under negligence law.  The foresight of harm 
standard is more demanding because it requires the actor to know a 
more complicated set of facts about the circumstances surrounding his 
conduct.  This is not to say that the actor who foresees the harm is 
necessarily aware of the immediate physical consequences; he may not 
be.  An actor may be able to foresee the harm to a third party without 
being aware of the immediate physical consequences of his act, as in the 
arrow shooter example just discussed. 
This comparison between intentional and negligent conduct 
illustrates the connection between the theory presented here and 
Holmes’s theory of intent standards.  Recall that Holmes said that intent 
reduces to knowledge of facts that allows the typical person to foresee 
the harm resulting from his actions.  It follows from this, and Holmes 
demonstrated, that when the likelihood of harm is very high 
(approaching one), as in the case of an intentional tort, the requisite 
knowledge of facts (necessary to foresee harm) is correspondingly low.  
When the likelihood of harm is not very high, the requisite knowledge of 
facts is correspondingly high, which applies to the case of negligence.  
The argument presented here is consistent with Holmes.  The key 
innovation in this argument is the explanation for the intent standard. 
                                                 
28 However, my argument has implications for the interpretation of the Hand Formula.  
The argument implies that the Hand Formula can be broken into a two-part analysis that 
begins with foreseeability and then considers burden.  It often ends with foreseeability too.  
The question of burden becomes relevant only when it is clear that the defendant foresaw 
or should have foreseen harm to a third party or to property.  The analysis often ends with 
foresight because plaintiffs bring negligence claims only in those cases where the burden of 
the proposed precaution is relatively small.  One implication of this argument is that there 
will be relatively few cases, in the sample of those reaching judgment, that actually 
examine the burden of precaution.  It follows that claims that the role of burden is 
exaggerated in the Hand analysis are of questionable validity.  Weinrib, for example, has 
made this assertion.  See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 148–50 (1995).  I find 
unpersuasive Weinrib’s claim that the English and Commonwealth approaches to 
negligence reveal a reluctance, in contrast to the American approach, to consider the 
burden of precaution.  The American and English approaches appear to be the same.  And 
the screening process that rational parties will implement in the litigation process will 
produce a sample of cases in which the burden of precaution is rarely considered. 
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The foregoing account of the intent standard provides a way of 
reconciling the seemingly conflicting results in the battery cases 
involving children as defendants.29  In Vosburg v. Putney, George Putney 
was held liable to Andrew Vosburg for the unexpectedly severe harm 
attributed to his kick.  One lesson often drawn from Vosburg v. Putney is 
that intent to harm or foresight of harm is not a requirement for liability 
under battery doctrine.  However, in Horton v. Reaves, the infant 
defendants, three- and four-year-old children, were not held liable for 
severe head injuries to a five-week old baby that they had rough-
handled while the baby’s mother was away.30  These seemingly 
conflicting results can be reconciled under the view that liability for 
battery requires awareness on the part of the injurer that his act will 
impose a cost on someone (secondary volitional intent).  George Putney 
was almost twelve years old when he kicked Andrew Vosburg, old 
enough to know that a kick could harm someone.  The infant defendants 
in Horton v. Reaves, though aware of their own physical acts, were not 
aware of the potential harm to the baby. 
B. Variation of Intent Standards within the Class of Basic Intentional Torts:  
The Role of Transaction Costs 
Secondary volitional conduct, in the sense of being aware of the 
immediate physical consequences of one’s action, is a necessary 
condition for liability for intentional conduct.  The reason is that tort law 
functions as a pricing mechanism that internalizes costs optimally.  The 
intent standard that serves this pricing role best in the intentional torts 
case is the secondary volitional level.  In this part, I argue that 
transaction costs play a role in determining whether the secondary 
volitional requirement is a sufficient as well as necessary condition for 
liability. 
Although secondary volitional conduct is generally necessary for 
liability in the intentional torts context, it is not always sufficient.  In 
general, the intent requirement is a little higher for battery than for 
trespass.  There is a well understood exception for liability in the case of 
a touching that is generally treated as a pleasantry.31  For example, if a 
                                                 
29 See, e.g., Horton v. Reaves, 526 P.2d 304, 308 (Colo. 1974); Walker v. Kelly, 314 A.2d 
785, 788 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1973); Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403, 404 (Wis. 1891). 
30 The apparent conflict between Vosburg v. Putney and Horton v. Reaves is noted in 
GRADY, supra note 15, at 108. 
31 E.g., Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 16 (Minn. 1905) (“[A]ny unlawful or 
unauthorized touching of the person of another, except it be in the spirit of pleasantry, 
constitutes assault and battery.”).  However, the pleasantry exception does not extend to 
the case in which the defendant acts against the objections of the plaintiff in order to do 
something that he thinks is best for the plaintiff.  See, e.g., Clayton v. New Dreamland 
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law partner pats an associate on the back to congratulate the associate for 
her work, most people would regard that touching as a pleasantry.  If, by 
some bizarre chain of events, the associate’s shoulder fell off after the 
touch, the associate would have a difficult time prevailing on a battery 
claim because of the pleasantry exception.  In short, the secondary 
volitional standard is necessary for batteries, but not always sufficient. 
I am aware of no such pleasantry exception in trespass law.  If A 
wanders over to B’s property and rearranges his flowers on the theory 
that the new arrangement will be more to B’s liking, A will be found 
guilty of trespass.  This is so even if A knows B’s preferences and is 
correct in his view that his arrangement will be preferred by B over the 
old flower arrangement.  The level of intent required by trespass is just 
an intention to have the immediate physical consequence, which is to be 
on B’s land.  There is no requirement that A intend to hurt B in any way 
and no exception for “pleasant trespasses.”  As a result, the secondary 
volitional requirement is both necessary and sufficient for trespass 
liability. 
Why do we observe this subtle difference between the intent 
standards for trespass and battery?  The reason is transaction costs, 
which are higher in the battery than in the trespass context.  Think of 
what happens in the battery context.  Many batteries arise in the course 
of spontaneous social interaction.  The law partner walks over to the 
associate and pats him on the back.  B taps C on the shoulder to get his 
attention.  Although the conduct is intentional, there is no time for the 
actor to seek permission from the person acted on.  To seek such 
permission in all cases would ground a good deal of social interaction to 
a halt. 
Trespasses to real property, in contrast, do not typically arise out of 
the context of spontaneous social interaction.  It is much easier, in 
general, than in the battery context for the actor to seek permission from 
the property owner before crossing the boundary.  Nothing requires A to 
act immediately to rearrange the flowers on B’s property.  A can contact 
B first and seek permission. 
Of course, trespass law makes exceptions in the cases where A had to 
act quickly with good reasons.  A ship owner who ties his boat to B’s 
dock in order to prevent it from being blown away in a storm does not 
have time to seek permission before using B’s property.  The law makes 
an exception by giving the ship owner a necessity defense to the trespass 
                                                                                                             
Roller Skating Rink, Inc., 82 A.2d 458, 463 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1951) (defendant liable for battery 
when defendant, over objections of plaintiff, manipulated plaintiff’s broken arm with the 
intention of aligning it correctly). 
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charge.32  The necessity argument typically arises in settings where 
transaction costs prevent negotiation from taking place before the actor 
uses another person’s property.  However, the exception provided by the 
necessity defense does not affect the liability of the actor who uses 
another person’s property.  The existence of a necessity defense does not 
absolve the actor from liability.33 
Because the transaction costs of seeking permission are lower in the 
trespass than in the battery context, the intent standard is also lower in 
the trespass context.  The reason is that the law encourages potential 
trespassers to seek permission and, if necessary, bargain for access rather 
than invading someone’s property.  Overall social costs are lower if 
people seek consent and if necessary pay for access to private property, 
rather than invade and compel property owners to litigate in order to 
enforce their entitlements. 
Even within the battery context, intent standards vary.  In Mohr v. 
Williams,34 a doctor was held liable for battery for operating on the 
patient’s left ear, when he had told the patient that he would operate on 
the right.  One could make the case that the doctor’s conduct should fall 
within the pleasantry exception for batteries.  The doctor’s decision took 
place under a high-transaction cost setting, since the patient had been 
anesthetized, and it was intended to leave the patient better off than she 
was before the operation.  That these arguments were insufficient to 
avoid liability for battery suggests that the triggering point for liability in 
medical intervention cases is lower than that for ordinary batteries.  The 
secondary volitional standard—awareness of immediate physical 
consequences—is both necessary and sufficient for liability in the 
medical invasion case. 
The transaction cost rationale serves as an adequate explanation for 
the relatively low intent standard for medical invasions.  In general, the 
costs of seeking permission for the precise invasion intended are low in 
the medical context.  The physician simply has to disclose his plans to 
the patient and seek consent.  Given the low cost of seeking consent, the 
intent standard sufficient for liability should also be low, as in the 
trespass setting.  Setting the intent standard low gives doctors, as well as 
trespassers, incentives to bargain first rather than invade, or to use the 
                                                 
32 Vincent v. Lake Erie, 124 N.W. 221, 222 (Minn. 1910); Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 189 
(Vt. 1908). 
33 Vincent, 124 N.W. at 222. 
34 104 N.W. 12, 16 (Minn. 1905). 
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market rather than take, which is a central goal of much of the common 
law.35 
As in the trespass setting, there are events that justify medical 
invasions where the physician has not received consent.  The most 
common is the case of emergency, which traditionally required a risk of 
death or serious injury to justify the nonconsensual invasion.  The 
emergency exception was expanded in Kennedy v. Parrot36 to allow a 
specific type of nonconsensual invasion, extensions of surgical 
operations within the area of the original incision, when the benefits of 
the operation clearly outweighed the costs of postponing it.  In both its 
traditional form and in the Kennedy v. Parrot version, the emergency 
defense involves a setting where transaction costs prevent the physician 
from gaining consent before the invasion.  The patient is typically under 
anesthesia already and the physician discovers that some nonconsensual 
invasion is necessary in order to prevent a serious injury to the patient. 
Although the transaction cost theory helps explain both the low 
intent standard for battery liability in the medical context, and the 
existence of the emergency defense, it also implies that the emergency 
defense should narrow in the present and future.  As medical technology 
progresses, the cost of gaining consent to all possible invasions 
connected to any planned surgery falls.  Physicians can use x-rays, 
magnetic resonance imaging, and ultrasound to see inside a patient’s 
body and obtain the information necessary to foresee all of the surgical 
procedures that might be desirable.  Because the costs of gaining consent 
to all foreseeable surgical procedures are falling, the courts should be 
less forgiving of nonconsensual invasions that are claimed by the 
physician to be justified under the emergency defense.37 
                                                 
35 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability:  One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1098 (1972); Richard A. 
Posner, An Economic Theory of Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1229 (1985).  See 
generally Keith N. Hylton, Property Rules and Liability Rules, Once Again, 2 REV. L. & ECON. 
137 (2006). 
36 90 S.E.2d 754, 760 (N.C. 1956) (during appendectomy, physician discovered cysts on 
plaintiff’s left ovary, which he punctured without plaintiff’s consent.) 
37 However, there is a factor that operates to increase transaction costs, even as 
technology works to reduce uncertainty.  As medical technology permits physicians to 
better foresee all desirable surgical procedures, it also gives them the ability to foresee all of 
the possible problems and contingencies.  The result could be an “information overload” in 
which physicians find it prohibitively costly to both predict and explain all of the 
sequences of events that might arise during surgery. 
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C. Tertiary Volitional Conduct as a Minimum Requirement of Tort Liability 
The tertiary volitional intent requirement—foreseeability of or intent 
to harm—applies to a broad class of intentional torts including assault, 
defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  
Foreseeability of harm or intent to harm is a necessary condition for 
liability within this class of torts.  This is a higher intent standard than 
that for trespass.  For simplicity, I focus on the standard for assault. 
The reason that the intent standard for assault requires more in 
terms of knowledge and awareness than that for battery is to avoid over-
internalization of costs (or, equivalently, over-regulation, or over-
deterrence).  Over-internalization means a level of internalization that 
over-deters or over-regulates the underlying activity by pushing it to a 
level such that the benefits forgone by constraining the activity exceed 
the costs avoided. 
To see the argument, compare the standard for assault to the 
standard for battery.  Recall that the assault standard requires intent to 
harm or to put one in fear of immediate harm.  Why not simply require 
the same intent level as battery—namely, the secondary volitional (or 
“awareness of immediate physical consequences”) standard? 
Suppose the intent standard for assault were the same as that for 
battery.  The first difficulty is determining what it would mean to apply 
the secondary volitional standard to assault.  It would be unworkable if a 
court held that intent to have immediate physical consequences were 
satisfied by a person who stretched his arms out, unaware of anyone else 
in his presence, when the other person was put in fear of harm by that 
action.  At a minimum, the secondary volitional intent level requires 
some awareness of an effect on a third person.  The only workable 
version of the secondary volitional standard in the context of assault 
would be one that finds the intent requirement satisfied when the 
defendant does an act that invades the plaintiff’s “zone of danger.”38  If 
we imagine a line drawn around the plaintiff beyond which he is safe 
from an immediate battery by the defendant, a defendant would invade 
that zone of danger by entering into that space in full awareness that the 
plaintiff perceives the invasion. 
Suppose, then, that the intent standard for assault required only an 
intent to invade the plaintiff’s zone of danger, as just defined.  Under this 
                                                 
38 The zone-of-danger test has been developed in the context of claims for damages 
connected to the negligent infliction of emotional distress.  See Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & 
Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513, 514 (Cal. 1963); Dulieu v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669 (1901).  These 
cases permit the plaintiff to recover damages caused by the negligent infliction of 
emotional distress if the plaintiff was in the zone of danger, in the sense of being personally 
at risk of serious physical injury. 
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standard, the plaintiff in Tuberville v. Savage39 probably would have been 
guilty of assault, which may have justified the defendant’s battery of the 
plaintiff.  The plaintiff put his hand on his sword and said to the 
defendant, “if it were not assize time, I would not take such language 
from you.”40  The court found that the plaintiff had not assaulted the 
defendant, so the defendant was held liable for his battery of the 
plaintiff. 
Although Tuberville supports the proposition that mere words are 
insufficient to constitute an assault, we have more than mere words in 
the case.  We also have the plaintiff putting his hand on his sword while 
speaking to the defendant.  If the plaintiff had been physically close 
enough to the defendant to strike him with the sword, the defendant 
may have felt threatened by the combination of words with a hand on 
the sword.  This presumably satisfies the invasion-of-personal-danger-
zone standard hypothesized here.  Under an intent standard that 
required proof that the defendant intended to invade the victim’s zone of 
personal danger, the plaintiff in Tuberville would have been guilty of 
assault. 
The over-deterrence risk becomes clear once we see that a lower 
intent standard for assault—specifically, one approximating the 
secondary volitional level by triggering liability when the defendant 
violates the plaintiff’s zone of danger—probably would have led to a 
different result in Tuberville.  The plaintiff’s conduct in Tuberville is 
expressive.  He wanted to emphasize his point that he found the 
defendant’s language insulting by saying that he should not tolerate it 
and at the same time putting his hand on his sword.  The combination of 
emphatic speech and gestures that could be viewed as threatening is 
common in ordinary social interaction.  A rule that imposed liability on 
such conduct would chill a good deal of ordinary speech. 
For example, many people have a habit of approaching the opposing 
party in the course of a heated argument, as if the physical closeness 
would force the opponent to shrink from his position.  This combination 
of speech and conduct is designed to get the attention of the other party, 
but it does so by making him think that there is at least a slight risk of an 
assault.  A colleague emphasizes his points in arguments at close range 
by putting his hand into the shape of a gun and aiming it at the target of 
his speech as he makes each of his points.  No one is fooled into thinking 
that he is about to be shot, but the technique does get the attention of the 
listener.  These examples involve—for better or for worse—common 
                                                 
39 86 Eng. Rep. 684 (K.B. 1669). 
40 Id. at 684. 
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methods of argument that could result in liability under a low intent 
standard for assault. 
It remains to explain why it would be undesirable to chill speech, 
though the point will be uncontroversial to most and the reason familiar 
from the literature.  Speech, as a form of information provision, is a 
public good.  As such, it delivers benefits that are non-rivalrous, in the 
sense that they can be shared by many.  One standard result of 
economics is that non-rivalrous goods tend to be underprovided in 
normal market conditions.  The law can help to correct this market 
failure by adopting liability standards that steer clear of imposing costs 
on the provision of information.41  This is the economic case for adopting 
liability standards that avoid burdening speech. 
Again, the function of liability is to set up a pricing mechanism that 
internalizes costs.  But there is a background reason for internalizing 
costs.  That reason is to generate activity that approximates what would 
result in an ideal market.  I have suggested so far that battery and assault 
differ in the sense that speech is a significant component of the activity 
that could give rise to assault charges.  Because speech is an important 
component of the activity, an intent rule that raises the triggering point 
for liability under assault higher than that for battery avoids over-
deterrence of speech. 
Now one could argue on the basis of the foregoing that since battery 
often has an expressive component, the tertiary volitional (intent to 
harm) standard should be applied to battery in order to avoid 
overinternalizing costs.  After all, war is simply politics carried out by 
other means.  I described assault as intermingled with speech, rather 
than expression, in order to avoid suggesting that the law should 
subsidize any conduct that can be described as expressive. 
The problem with the war-as-politics argument is that battery, if it 
can be described accurately as expression, is an extremely unproductive 
and costly form of it.  A person who says “I hate the New York 
Yankees,” communicates the idea to others more effectively than 
someone who beats up Yankees fans.  Battery, as a form of expression, is 
so much less effective and more costly than speech that arguments for 
subsidizing speech cannot be carried over to the case of expressive 
battery. 
1. Defamation and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
The argument presented so far for applying the tertiary volitional 
(intent to harm) standard to assault applies also to the torts of 
                                                 
41 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 262 (1981). 
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defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Both torts 
involve speech.  Defamation involves speech that damages the 
reputation of the victim.  Intentional infliction of emotional distress 
involves speech that harms the victim directly.  In both cases, the intent 
to harm standard applies. 
To be sure, there are differences in the way the intent-to-harm 
standard is described in the legal tests for defamation and for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.  These differences seem to suggest that 
the standards differ from each other and that they perhaps should not be 
described as intent-to-harm tests.  Still, if one cuts to the core function of 
the standards in both cases, it appears fair to treat them as intent-to-harm 
standards. 
Defamation, for example, has been described as a strict liability tort 
(e.g., Prosser) and by others as requiring proof of malice (e.g., Holmes).  
The strict liability position asserts that the defendant is strictly liable for 
defamation, but has defenses available based on truth and privilege.42  
The malice view asserts that the defendant is liable for defamation only if 
no defense based on privilege or truth can be successfully asserted, and 
in that case, the defendant is deemed to have acted with malice.43  Both 
positions say the same thing about defamation, describing the glass as 
either half-empty or half-full. 
Whether one describes defamation as a strict liability tort or one 
based on fault or malice is unimportant.  Under either description, the 
intent standard that triggers liability is the tertiary volitional (intent to 
harm) standard.  To see this, suppose it is established that the defendant 
has no credible defense based on truth or privilege.  The absence of a 
privilege means that there is no objective benefit deriving from the 
defendant’s defamatory statement to himself, the victim, or some third 
party.  The reasonable inference is that the defendant made his 
defamatory statement for the sole purpose of imposing a loss on the 
victim.  This is the kind of intent that the tertiary volitional standard 
requires. 
Suppose a defendant in a defamation action does have a credible 
defense based on privilege.  That means that even though there was a 
substantial and foreseeable harm to the plaintiff, there was also a 
substantial benefit to someone.  For example, a prospective employer 
may have been warned about the plaintiff’s propensity to steal.  Since the 
defendant was aware of the cost imposed on the plaintiff, the 
defendant’s intent level satisfies the secondary volitional standard 
because he was aware that a cost would be imposed on someone.  Since 
                                                 
42 PROSSER, supra note 1, at 772–74. 
43 HOLMES, supra note 7, at 138–40.  
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defamation law holds that mere knowledge that a cost would be 
imposed on someone is insufficient for liability, it rejects the secondary 
volitional standard applied in the cases of battery and trespass. 
Now consider intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The 
Restatement says that in addition to malice or intent to harm, the law 
requires extreme or outrageous conduct.44  But these additional 
requirements appear to be designed to provide an objective standard or 
barrier that prevents unusually sensitive or timid plaintiffs from flooding 
the courts with claims of emotional distress.  The outrageousness 
requirement does not change the intent standard from the tertiary 
volitional level to some higher intent level.  It is merely an effort to make 
the standard administrable. 
2. Economic Harms 
This framework applies to the economic harm cases as well.  The 
tertiary volitional or intent-to-harm standard applies, in the sense that 
the actor will not be found liable unless the facts imply that the sole 
purpose for his acts was to harm the victim.  The reason the tertiary 
volitional standard applies is the same as in the case of assault: in order 
to avoid deterrence of socially beneficial activity. 
Consider tort law’s treatment of economic predation.  The most 
common types of claims in this area are inducement of breach of 
contract, interference with prospective advantage, and unfair 
competition.  To illustrate the point that the tertiary volitional standard 
applies, I consider two of the economic harm cases examined by Epstein 
in his study of intentional torts. 
In Mogul Steamship Company v. McGregor Gow & Company, the 
defendant shipowners formed a conspiracy for the purpose of gaining 
exclusive control over the shipping of tea from China to England.45  The 
defendants offered a rebate on each shipment, which the customer 
would forfeit for the entire year if he shipped tea with a firm that was 
not a member of the cartel.  They also agreed that if any shipper outside 
the cartel attempted to compete with them, they would drive the freight 
rate to a level that would make it unprofitable.  The plaintiff, one of the 
firms excluded from the cartel, claimed that the defendants had 
intentionally deprived him of his right to ship tea on the China-England 
route.  The plaintiff’s claim was dismissed because: 
                                                 
44 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1966) (noting that one who by extreme and 
outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another 
is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results 
from it, for such bodily harm). 
45 23 Q.B.D. 598, 598 (1889), aff’d, [1892] A.C. 25. 
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there was here no personal intention to do any other or 
greater harm to the plaintiffs than such as was 
necessarily involved in the desire to attract to the 
defendants’ ships the entire tea freights of the ports, a 
portion of which would otherwise have fallen to the 
plaintiff’s share.46 
This was a zero sum game, in the sense that all of the trade would either 
go to the defendants or some of the trade would go to the plaintiff.  The 
court’s conclusion suggests that the defendants would not be held liable 
as long as they were trying to ensure that they got all of the trade.  On 
the other hand, if they took actions that went beyond simply trying to 
garner all of the business, the court would have decided in favor of the 
plaintiff. 
Mogul v. McGregor can be understood as establishing the tertiary 
volitional (intent to harm) standard as a requirement for liability in 
economic predation cases.  The court clearly rejected the secondary 
volitional (knowledge of potential harm) standard, since its decision 
would allow the defendants to impose a cost on the plaintiff (losing his 
business) as long as it was a necessary byproduct of trying to gain as 
much business as they could.  Mogul v. McGregor implies that defendants 
would be held liable for competitive conduct only if the facts suggest 
that the sole purpose of the conduct is to harm the plaintiff. 
The intent to harm standard is the optimal standard for cases of 
predatory competitive conduct.  The reason is that a lower standard, 
specifically one triggering liability on the basis of knowledge of harm 
(secondary volitional), risks imposing liability on every act of 
competition.  Competition, like speech, is activity that provides spillover 
benefits beyond the particular customer who happens to find an item at 
an unusually cheap price.  Competition pushes a commodity’s price 
toward marginal supply cost, which maximizes the difference between 
the social benefits of consumption and the resource costs of supply.  The 
intent standard adopted in Mogul v. McGregor provides a subsidy of a 
sort to competitive market activity. 
Keeble v. Hickeringill is an example where the defendant was held 
liable for economic predation.47  The plaintiff used duck decoys to lure 
fowl to his land, to capture and sell.  The defendant turned the fowl 
away by shooting his gun and was held liable. 
Under the hypothesis that the tertiary volitional standard is required 
for cases of economic predation, Keeble v. Hickeringill is easily reconciled 
                                                 
46 23 Q.B.D. at 614. 
47 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (Q.B. 1706). 
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with Mogul v. McGregor.  In Mogul v. McGregor, the defendants’ 
interference with the plaintiff’s business was a necessary byproduct of 
their effort to secure all of the trade to themselves.  In Keeble v. 
Hickeringill, the defendant set out to destroy the plaintiff’s business; 
destruction was the sole purpose of his conduct. 
V.  ECONOMICS VERSUS CONSENT AS EXPLANATIONS 
FOR INTENTIONAL TORT DOCTRINES 
As noted, Epstein’s consent-based analysis is the only piece in the 
law and economics journals that looks closely at the intent standards 
articulated in tort law.  His analysis rejects economics as a way of 
understanding the law of intentional torts.  My effort has been to show 
that the economic approach can indeed be used to explain the intent 
standards of tort law at a high level of detail. 
The consent-based approach seems to have a great deal of 
explanatory power when we first focus on the intent standard for 
battery.  Because the intent level required for liability under battery is 
only the secondary volitional level (awareness of contact), one could 
argue that liability for battery is based on lack of consent.  In other 
words, since intent to do harm is not a necessary condition for liability, 
one could argue that the essential feature triggering liability is failure to 
gain consent. 
However, the consent-based approach does not seem to provide an 
explanation for the secondary volitional level as the necessary condition 
for liability for intentional torts.  If lack of consent is the key reason for 
liability, then why not hold someone liable for battery even when they 
are unaware of the cost imposed on the victim?  Why should a person 
who stretches out his arm while yawning, and hits another person, be 
able to avoid liability for battery if consent is the key to understanding 
intentional tort doctrine?  If consent is at the source of the law on battery, 
why should a person who is thrown from his horse and lands on 
someone else be able to avoid liability?  Once these questions are 
answered, the consent theory needs to explain why intent to harm 
(tertiary volitional) is the necessary condition for liability for assault. 
In order for a theory based on consent to serve as an adequate 
rationale for intentional tort doctrine, it must be coupled with a theory of 
fundamental rights, which is part of Epstein’s analysis to be sure.  A 
theory of fundamental rights, however, forces us to inquire into the 
source of these rights, which has been controversial since Bentham.  In 
the end, there may very well be a good explanation for their source.  The 
economic approach has the advantage of providing an explanation for 
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the rules while avoiding the controversial and daunting task of 
specifying a set of a priori fundamental rights. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Economic analysis of law has expressed puzzlement at the intent 
rules in the law, beginning with Becker’s discussion of criminal law in 
1968.48  Under the standard economic approach, which focuses on 
internalization of external costs, the actor’s intent would appear to be 
irrelevant.  External costs should be internalized, or shifted back to the 
source, whether or not the actor intended to externalize them. 
This Lecture advances the literature by using economic reasoning to 
explain the legal rules governing intentional torts.  The main lesson is 
that if one’s goal is to internalize costs in an optimal manner, intent does 
matter.  The intent rules of tort law function as a pricing mechanism that 
ensures optimal regulation of injury-causing activity.  Optimal 
regulation avoids underdeterrence of harmful conduct and 
overdeterrence of beneficial activities.  A careful look at the various 
intent levels identified in tort law suggests that the ones actually used by 
courts as necessary conditions for liability appear to perform better than 
available alternatives as regulatory devices. 
                                                 
48 See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:  An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. & 
ECON. 169 (1968). 
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